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| International Relations: Nagorno Karabagh: A White Paper |
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| Nagorno Karabagh A White Paper | |
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(Copyright © March 1997, The Armenian Center for
National and International Studies, Yerevan, Armenia. This publication is sponsored by the Armenian Assembly of America, Washington, D.C.)
The Sources of Confrontation
The Retreat from Budapest to Lisbon
This White Paper provides a comprehensive summary of the issues that have emerged with the appearance of the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh in the post-Soviet period. Born out of conflict and de facto in existence, Nagorno Karabagh remains a subject of international importance. This White Paper explains the background to the conflict, offers the basic reasons for the appearance of the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh, and highlights the outstanding critical issues which are presently impeding a negotiated settlement. A cease-fire, in place since 1994, has provided the opportunity to seek a comprehensive peace that resolves the differences between the parties to the conflict. Complications in the negotiations process, however, have delayed the quest for peace and security in the region. This was manifest in the December 2-3, 1996, biennial summit of the OSCE in Lisbon where, once again, basic agreements on governing principles could not be reached. If anything, the failure at the summit underscores the unique aspects of the Karabagh question and the special attention it deserves. Founded and directed by Armenia's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Armenian Center for National and International Studies is a Yerevan-based institute linking scholarly research with the emerging public policy issues facing the Armenian people in the post-Soviet environment. Soon after the Center issued the first edition of the White Paper, the rapid course of developments surrounding the negotiations process necessitated the preparation of a second edition. International settlement of the Karabagh question remains central to solving the problems of the Caucasus. We hope that the explanations and clarifications provided by the White Paper will contribute to the process of reconciling the parties and of achieving a lasting peace in the region.
The Republic of Nagorno Karabagh is a current reality. The former autonomous district of the Soviet Union has become a full-fledged state entity with its own government and defense forces. Tested in conflict, the new republic has demonstrated a capacity to withstand military assault and to bring warfare on its territories to an end. A set of basic facts has emerged since the breakup of the Soviet Union, especially in the Caucasus, where the process of decolonization has proceeded further than in any other part of the former USSR. Once autonomous districts, inhabited by ethnic groups distinct from the majority population of the newly independent states in the region, have asserted their right of self-determination. In the absence of new constitutional and legal guarantees for their separate existence, independence has been the remedy to their dilemma. While each has succeeded to a different degree, the case of Nagorno Karabagh stands as a rare example of a people who have achieved de facto independence. This new condition has become a test of the post-Soviet order. It also presents a challenge for the international community to meet the emergent needs with a method for the recognition of existing political facts. Legal principles which have served states well in the past are now proven insufficiently developed to meet this new challenge. A reconciliation between facts and internationally sanctioned legal remedies is required to bridge the gap between de facto and de jure existence. To delay the search for a remedy is to invite further conflict. In light of the fact that a cease-fire is the only agreement keeping the peace in the region, the urgency of finding a solution to the questions raised by the de facto existence of the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh cannot be overstated. Arguments over legal principles which are deliberately juxtaposed against each other run the risk of unleashing confrontation over lives and property. Little has been invested in reconciling and bridging the legal principles in question. Arguments in the abstract that overlook the long-standing historical sources of conflict must be overcome, lest they provide further justification for perpetuating conflict as opposed to solving it. The twentieth century has been a period of successive tragedies for the Armenian people. Genocide in Ottoman Turkey in the first part of the century and forced deportations of and pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijan as recently as the late 1980s and early 1990s lie at the core of Nagorno Karabagh's insistence on guaranteed security for its citizenry. There is every reason to believe that the conflict over Nagorno Karabagh can be solved. All parties concerned have demonstrated a commitment to avoiding a resumption of hostilities. A balance of forces has emerged that discourages the use of the military option. The international community has invested serious effort in bringing the parties in conflict to the negotiating table for a political settlement. Negotiations are being conducted by various parties and on multiple tracks. The OSCE and other third parties continue to mediate. These developments are evidence that most, if not all, parties concerned are interested in a comprehensive settlement to bring the conflict to a conclusive end and build guarantees which will prevent the recurrence of warfare in the region. International law is always in the process of development. Creative applications of existing laws and principles are required. These must provide respect for the civil and political rights of the inhabitants of small state entities that are emerging from the process of decolonization. To meet these challenges, reasonable and logical derivations from existing principles can be formulated. The Republic of Nagorno Karabagh itself has offered new concepts. They reconcile the principle of self-determination for a previously autonomous, now fully self-governing territory, Nagorno Karabagh, with that of the territorial integrity of the newly independent Republic of Azerbaijan. These take into account the prevailing international legal order, while ensuring the full range of political rights to which Karabagh is entitled. These concepts, which are herein explained in detail, deserve close attention and examination.
The Sources of Confrontation During the seven decades of the USSR's existence, the government of Soviet Azerbaijan conducted a systematic policy of removal of Karabagh Armenians from their historic homeland. While Soviet statistics are not always reliable and have been suspected of deliberately undercounting ethnicity figures, they show that from 1923 to 1979 the Armenian population of Karabagh was reduced from 150,000 to 120,000, while the influx of new settlers increased the Azeri population five-fold from 7,500 in 1923 to 38,000 in 1979. This radical change in Karabagh's ethno-demographic composition has exacerbated decades of conflict between Azerbaijan and the Armenians of Karabagh. Despite repeated appeals to Moscow to rectify the political status of Nagorno Karabagh, the matter remained unresolved until 1987-88 when Mikhail Gorbachev announced the new policy of "perestroika." At that time a political rights movement emerged in Karabagh and found strong support in Armenia. As the movement gained momentum, it was met by massacres and other acts of violence against Armenians in Sumgait, Baku, and other places in Azerbaijan. When the Soviet Union finally collapsed, Azerbaijan resorted to direct military actions against Karabagh in order to resolve the long-standing Armenian problem by force. Open conflict between the Armenians of Karabagh and their Azerbaijani rulers followed, and after thousands of casualties on both sides, the Armenians of Karabagh prevailed. The Current Situation The demographic situation in the region has changed dramatically. An enormous number of persons--both Armenian and Azerbaijani--have become refugees. Years before the conflict became militarized, through a series of pogroms, 340,000 Armenians were forcibly expelled from Azerbaijan. Tens of thousands of Armenians in Nagorno Karabagh were also displaced when the region was turned into a battlefield and nearly half of its territory was occupied by Azerbaijani armed forces. The issue of control over disputed lands is now a major problem between the conflicting sides. The line of contact between the military positions of Nagorno Karabagh and Azerbaijan in the conflict zone constitutes the de facto borders separating the contending sides. The current cease-fire along the entire line of contact has been in place since May 1994. Presently, Nagorno Karabagh's Army of Defense controls several Azerbaijani regions which, while outside of Nagorno Karabagh proper, are integral to the republic's national security. At the same time, Azerbaijan controls a number of territories belonging to Nagorno Karabagh, including the Shahumian district and some parts of Mardakert. Since 1992, international negotiations to resolve the conflict have been underway within the framework of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE; formerly CSCE). Eleven member states of the OSCE formed a negotiations team called the Minsk Group to undertake peace talks. Azerbaijan has vacillated between intense opposition to and reluctant acceptance of Nagorno Karabagh's direct participation in these negotiations. The international negotiations have intermittently accepted the reality that it is the government of Nagorno Karabagh, and not Armenia, which is the main party in the conflict with Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Nagorno Karabagh has achieved its sovereignty in accordance with both international law and the domestic laws of the USSR in force at the time it declared independence. The republic, nonetheless, has not yet been recognized by the international community as an independent state.
Historical and Pre-Soviet Status According to the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan, Karabagh was transferred from Persian to Russian dominion. This marked the beginning of a period of security and prosperity for the Armenians of Karabagh. The city of Shushi flourished as a major center of Armenian cultural and economic life. The area remained undisturbed even during the early years of World War I. Karabagh between 1918 and 1920 The massacre in Shushi threatened to widen the scope of the genocide carried out against the Armenians in Ottoman Turkey starting in 1915. Aided and abetted by the Turkish army, Azerbaijani forces had already committed a series of atrocities against the Armenians in Baku and elsewhere in 1918. The convergent methods of the Turks and Azerbaijanis threatened the very existence of the Armenian people in the Caucasus. Violent conflict, however, soon ended with the sovietization of the Caucasian republics. On November 30, 1920, the sovietized government of Azerbaijan recognized Nagorno Karabagh as a part of Armenia, and in June 1921 the government of Soviet Armenia did likewise. Nagorno Karabagh and Stalin's Gerrymandering On July 7, 1923, Soviet Azerbaijan's Revolutionary Committee resolved to dismember Karabagh and to create on part of its territory the Autonomous Region (Oblast) of Nagorno Karabagh. From 1924 to 1929, on the territory of the present-day districts of Lachin and Kelbajar, an uncertain jurisdiction called "Red Kurdistan" was established, with the intent of effectively separating Nagorno Karabagh from Armenia. In 1930, the Kurdish autonomous area was abolished but the artificial buffer between Armenia and Karabagh was retained. Stalin's 1936 Constitution sealed this territorial arrangement. Karabagh's Petitions to the Kremlin Against the backdrop of the less repressive years of the Khrushchev era in the early 1960s, the June 1965 letter of Nagorno Karabagh's Armenian intelligentsia (known as "The Letter of Thirteen") became the first such missive addressed to the government of the USSR. Furthermore, in September 1966, the Soviet Armenian leadership petitioned the central authorities to examine the question of returning Karabagh to Armenia. Under pressure from the Azerbaijani SSR, the matter was shelved, but it emerged once again on the occasion of Gorbachev's democratic reforms. In 1987-88, thousands of letters were sent to the Kremlin from Nagorno Karabagh with the consistent demand for secession. Each positive reaction, albeit slight, by representatives of the Soviet Union only intensified the movement to free Karabagh from the suzerainty of Azerbaijan.
The Beginnings of the Current Conflict Karabagh under Perestroika On June 13, 1988, the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani SSR denied the application of the Karabagh Assembly. However, this was counterbalanced on June 15 by Armenia's Supreme Soviet, which approved Karabagh's proposal and appealed to the Soviet government to resolve the matter. Moscow's Attempts at Direct Governance However, by the March 24, 1988, resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and subsequent implementing directives from the Soviet government,[3]Arkadi Volsky, a high-level official of the Soviet Communist Party, was appointed Moscow's authorized representative in the territory. Beginning on January 20, 1989, the Supreme Soviet established a special authority in Nagorno Karabagh, headed by Volsky, which was directly subject to the USSR government. This created precedent for the limitation of Soviet Azerbaijan's political control over the territory of Nagorno Karabagh, and a National Council was formed in the summer of 1989 by authorized representatives of the people. Azerbaijan's Suppression of Nagorno Karabagh's
Autonomy Polianichko aimed to resolve the issue by ridding Karabagh of its Armenian majority. He took measures to artificially increase the size of the Azerbaijani community in Nagorno Karabagh and alter the territory's demographic makeup. A great number of residences were built in Karabagh for Azerbaijani refugees who had fled Armenia between 1988 and 1990. As a consequence of this intentional alteration of the demographic balance combined with concerted military actions by Polianichko's orgkom, the Azerbaijani special police force, and the Soviet Army detachments located in Nagorno Karabagh, Soviet Azerbaijan placed more than half of Nagorno Karabagh's territory under military occupation. Moreover, Shushi, Lachin, and other strategic settlements in and around Karabagh were transformed into Azerbaijani military bases, seriously jeopardizing the existence of the isolated Armenian enclave. On November 23, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan, having already declared its own independence from the USSR and flouting Articles 86 and 87 of the Soviet Constitution which codified autonomous region status for Nagorno Karabagh and prohibited any change therein without its consent, adopted a resolution on the "Abolition of the Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous Oblast." In so doing, Baku also violated its own law, enacted on June 16, 1987, which regulated the relations between Soviet Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabagh. This law prohibited infringement of the latter's borders without its explicit consent. Azerbaijan's decision was also a response to a December 1, 1989, resolution of Armenia's Supreme Soviet unanimously calling for "The Reunion of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno Karabagh." On November 27, 1991, the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee's resolution deemed unconstitutional the orgkom created by the Supreme Soviet decision of January 15, 1990, as well as the November 23, 1991, Azerbaijani decision abolishing Karabagh's autonomy. It also revoked the December 1, 1989, Armenian resolution on reunification. While this action restored Karabagh's pre-1988 status and hence had juridical significance, it included no provisions to achieve security and viability for the beleaguered territory. Declarations of Independence by Azerbaijan
and Nagorno Karabagh This act fully complied with existing law. Indeed, the 1990 Soviet law titled "On the procedures for a Union Republic to leave the USSR," particularly Articles 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 19, provides that the secession of a Soviet republic from the body of the USSR allows an autonomous region in the same republic's territory also to trigger its own process of independence. On October 18, 1991, the Azerbaijani Republic confirmed its independence by adoption of its "Constitutional Act" on national independence, and on November 23 of the same year annulled Karabagh's autonomy. Based on this and the aforementioned law on secession, on December 10 Nagorno Karabagh held its own referendum on independence in the presence of international observers and media representatives. The vote overwhelmingly approved Karabagh's sovereignty, with 82.2 percent of Karabagh's registered voters participating in the elections and 99.89 percent of those casting ballots supporting its independence from the already seceded Republic of Azerbaijan. The actions of Nagorno Karabagh, which at that time was part of a still existent and internationally recognized Soviet Union, corresponded fully with the relevant Soviet law pertaining to leaving the USSR. It was the only autonomous region of the Soviet empire which gained independence, not only by virtue of international law as discussed below, but under domestic Soviet legislation as well. As part of its path to full sovereignty, the newly independent Nagorno Karabagh Republic created legitimate government institutions. On December 28, 1991, elections took place for its parliament, and on January 6, 1992, the newly convened parliament of Karabagh adopted its Declaration of Independence on the basis of the referendum results. On September 20, 1992, the body petitioned the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and individual countries for recognition of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic. In December 1994, Parliament adopted a resolution establishing the post of president of the republic.[4] From 1991 to 1994, the government of Nagorno Karabagh laid the basis for the security and viability of the republic. The Karabagh Army of Defense, having been formed against the backdrop of joint Soviet and Azerbaijani military operations, successfully breached Baku's blockade in 1992 by opening the Lachin Corridor to Armenia and the world. Subsequently, in response to Azerbaijan's incessant military strikes against civilian population centers and its occupation of northern Karabagh, in 1993 the armed forces took control of Kelbajar, Agdam, and other Azerbaijani strongholds to solve the problem of security through defensible borders. In so doing, it safeguarded Karabagh's territory from external aggression and prevented a tragic repetition of history. This clearly was a case of reactive, occasionally preemptive, self-defense.
Nagorno Karabagh, Regional Powers, and the OSCE Background In late 1991, Russia was the first country to offer mediation. After the visit to Nagorno Karabagh of presidents Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, a joint declaration was signed in Zheleznovodsk, Russia, with the participation of representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno Karabagh. The second attempt was made by the Islamic Republic of Iran in February-March 1992. Iran's activity culminated on May 8, 1992, in Tehran, with the adoption of a quadrilateral agreement on the problem of Nagorno Karabagh. The agreement was signed by high-level executives of Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia, but was nullified when military operations resumed in the conflict zone. Iran thereupon suspended its mission of active mediation. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; later OSCE) commenced its direct mediation of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict in June 1992, although its first contacts with the opposing sides date back to February of the same year. The peace process was initiated by the meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers at Helsinki on March 24, 1992. This meeting established the mandate of the so-called Minsk Group[5] of 11 member-states charged with preparing a peace conference to be held in the Belarus capital within the CSCE framework. Under the Minsk Group's mandate, Nagorno Karabagh obtained the right to participate as an interested party and with the status of "elected and other representatives of Nagorno Karabagh." A call to end all blockades and to open a humanitarian corridor to Karabagh was also issued. However, the status of Nagorno Karabagh's participation proved to be ambiguous and the practice of the Minsk Group chairman to deal with Karabagh indirectly via Armenia's delegation was unsatisfactory to Karabagh's representatives. To make matters worse, and in defiance of the 1992 Helsinki mandate, Nagorno Karabagh was frequently represented in the Minsk Group through the prism of two communities: Armenian and Azerbaijani. Such a position distorted the essence of the problem and transposed it into an intercommunal conflict. Accordingly, the government of Nagorno Karabagh raised the question of clarifying its participation status, which resulted in the conduct of the first two sessions of the Minsk Group, in June 1992, without the presence of Nagorno Karabagh's delegation. The Karabagh delegates appeared the following month at the third session, in Rome, and took part for the limited purpose of determining the status of their participation. Thereafter, based on an interim arrangement, the activity of the Minsk Group continued without interruption and with the active participation of Nagorno Karabagh until September 1993, when the conflicting sides failed to agree to the "adjusted timetable" proposed by the Minsk Group. The reason was that Azerbaijan's armed forces had just launched a massive military offensive. The Karabagh peace process entered a new phase between March and December 1994, when again at Russia's initiative consultative meetings of experts were convened. This circumstance complicated the relations between Russia and its CSCE partners and continued until the CSCE summit in Budapest in December 1994,[6] when a decision was made to establish a co-presidency of the Minsk Group, to comprise the Russian representative and a Minsk Group counterpart. As a result, the negotiations within the Minsk Group were resumed in January 1995 and continue to this day. Interested Third Parties On the other hand, Iran has pursued a different type of policy. While it has been less interventionist, it has also sought to keep the forces in the region in balance and to prevent any spill-over effects. For instance, it has assisted in the organization of camps for the displaced in Azerbaijan. At the same time, it has established economic relations with Armenia and maintained contacts with the Karabagh government. Russia still plays a large role in the political and military processes of the region. The parties to the confrontation continue to be armed largely with Russian weapons. Furthermore, Russia continues to be the most active mediator by whose efforts, for example, the cease-fire introduced on May 12, 1994, remains in effect. Days earlier, Russia was instrumental in the negotiations held in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic on May 5, 1994, which resulted in the signing of the cease-fire agreement by all the conflicting sides. From time to time, the United States and several European states have exercised their own initiatives within the Minsk Group. The United States has also appointed a special envoy to facilitate the negotiations process. Some of the proposals made by Western states have promoted one-sided solutions seeking to restrict the status of Nagorno Karabagh to an undefined level of autonomy within Azerbaijan. These proposals have been rejected by the governments of Nagorno Karabagh and Armenia. Both argue that these strategies prejudice the outcome of the Minsk process and can even jeopardize the maintenance of the existing cease-fire agreement. Karabagh's Role in the Negotiations It is the firm position of Nagorno Karabagh that the withdrawal of armies from occupied territories, the return of refugees to their previous residences, and the determination of its political status can only be resolved with its direct participation in the negotiations process. By the document adopted at the CSCE Budapest Summit in December 1994, the Minsk Group's participating countries recognized Karabagh as a party to the conflict. Moreover, in the various negotiations devoted to the peaceful settlement of the conflict, a series of documents have borne the signature of officials of Nagorno Karabagh represented as a separate entity. These documents include the Zheleznovodsk Communique of September 23, 1991, after official talks held in Zheleznovodsk, Russia at the initiative of the Russian and Kazakh presidents; the Timetable of Urgent Steps proposed by the chairman of the CSCE Minsk Group, on June 14, 1993; the Moscow Communique of February 18, 1994, following negotiations among the defense ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the representative of Nagorno Karabagh's Army of Defense; the Bishkek Protocol of May 9, 1994, as the fruit of negotiations among the parliament speakers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Nagorno Karabagh Republic undertaken within the framework of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly Mediation Mission; and the Agreement on Cease-Fire, mediated by Russia on May 12, 1994, among the ministers of defense of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the commander of Nagorno Karabagh's armed forces.
Karabagh's Position on Core Issues Legal Issues Karabagh has never, legally or otherwise, belonged to a sovereign, independent Azerbaijan. Its inclusion in 1921 in the structure of the Azerbaijani SSR was unlawfully ordered by a political party (not even a government) of a third country, that is, the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party. During the USSR's existence, Nagorno Karabagh was part of a multilayered colonial system and was subjected to Soviet Azerbaijan, not on a contractual basis, but by an administrative reference to the Soviet Constitution. The contradiction between Articles 70 (self-determination of peoples) and 78 (territorial integrity of Union republics) of this Constitution was resolved on April 3, 1990, by the adoption of the law on secession. The independence of Azerbaijan from the USSR is the first, while the independence of Nagorno Karabagh from Soviet Azerbaijan is the second level of decolonization achieved pursuant to this law. This is precisely how Karabagh resolved the legal novelty presented by the demise of the very empire whose sole political party had placed it under the administration of one of its constituent republics. In addition, the independence of Nagorno Karabagh was effected under the norms of international law. The principle of self-determination--a people's right to enjoy equal liberties and to determine its own political destiny--as confirmed in the Helsinki Final Act clearly applies to Nagorno Karabagh. It was in conformity with this international legal standard that Karabagh conducted its referendum on independence on December 10, 1991. As all ten precepts of the Helsinki Final Act have equal value, the principle of self-determination of peoples cannot, as Azerbaijan and other states have asserted, be deemed inferior to the notion of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders which governs interstate relations. They must be read together and in the context of another Helsinki principle: the peaceful settlement of disputes. Relevant United Nations documents enshrining the rights of self-determination and decolonization, coupled with a variety of concrete instances of independence gained under the UN umbrella, also provide compelling precedents for the Karabagh position. Nagorno Karabagh is a distinct party to the conflict with Azerbaijan. The attempts of Azerbaijan to present Armenia as its adversary have little foundation in fact and are intended to convert the question of Nagorno Karabagh's self-determination and the disintegration of the Soviet Union's colonial hierarchy into an issue of international confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Problems of Security The Russian-brokered cease-fire accord was concluded by the parties to the conflict on May 12, 1994. At present, they are agreed on the line of contact between the armies. Because defense structures have been erected all along this line, neither side can breach that line without suffering significant losses. The chief guarantor of Nagorno Karabagh's security is the republic's Army of Defense, which was formed during the military confrontation with Azerbaijan. According to Stepanakert, Karabagh's present-day capital, the cease-fire is the result of a military-political equilibrium established in the region. Because of this balance of forces, Stepanakert has ruled out breaching the equilibrium of its own initiative. Therefore, any decision that might affect the military capacity of its armed forces, as well as any potential resolution that does not foresee their continued lawful existence, is unacceptable for Nagorno Karabagh. The Azerbaijani territories occupied in 1993 by the Nagorno Karabagh army are part and parcel of the republic's current security system. Nagorno Karabagh has consistently maintained that it has no territorial claims concerning Azerbaijan and is prepared to withdraw its forces from certain of those territories upon reaching agreement on appropriate political and security-related matters. Stepanakert also maintains that it will not accept the transfer of the Shushi and Lachin districts to Azerbaijani control. Its position is that Shushi is an indivisible part of Karabagh. The issue, therefore, may be productively broached only in the context of refugee problems. For its part, Lachin is a humanitarian corridor opened by the Karabagh army, and it constitutes the new republic's sole access to the outside world. As such, the question of the Lachin Corridor remains a critical component of a settlement. Stepanakert further maintains the position that any modification of the contact line as a result of the transfer of territories in either direction depends on international guarantees[7] for the non-resumption of military operations. Nagorno Karabagh sees such a guarantee in the deployment of a multinational buffer force along the line of contact. In this connection, Turkey is the one Minsk Group country whose participation in an armed peacekeeping mission cannot be accepted by Karabagh because of its participation in the blockade of Armenia and its substantive support of Azerbaijan's military actions against Karabagh.[8] Nonetheless, as the result of arrangements mediated by the Minsk Group, in the summer of 1993 the conflicting sides came to an agreement in principle on the deployment of CSCE peacekeepers in the conflict zone. The budget of the peacekeeping force was determined, and an expert group charged with preparing conditions for deployment was identified. A similar mandate had previously been approved for CSCE monitors. To date, however, no practical progress has been registered. The parties to the conflict continue to be far apart in the negotiations for a political settlement, even on the issue of who the actual parties are.[9] The continued divergence between the mediators--Russia and the OSCE--on the organization of a peacekeeping force, chain of command, and the level of participation of different countries has also delayed the peace process. Refugees As a result of the anti-Armenian pogroms and deportations between 1988 and 1991, 340,000 Armenians have abandoned their homes in Azerbaijan and have become refugees in Nagorno Karabagh, in Armenia, or abroad. Between June and August 1992, more than 20,000 people fled the Shahumian region and part of the Mardakert district of Karabagh in the wake of their occupation by the Azerbaijani army. The number of resettled Armenian refugees is about 110,000-25,000 of whom were allotted homes in Shushi, Lachin, and abandoned Azerbaijani pockets in Nagorno Karabagh. During the same period of time, approximately 154,000 Azerbaijani refugees left the territory of Armenia. 418,000 Azerbaijanis, including 38,000 from Karabagh, have escaped from the zone of military operations. A total of 447,000 Azerbaijani refugees have been accommodated in the 91,000 Armenian-owned residences in Azerbaijan that were left behind by Armenians fleeing pogroms and in refugee camps and centers. The return of refugees is dependent on issues of governance and military control. The safe return of refugees is impossible without resolution of the administrative and political status of the territories to which they are to return. Humanitarian Assistance An amendment offered by Congressman John Porter, instructing that the provision of humanitarian aid in 1997 be made directly to Azerbaijan and to Nagorno Karabagh and in the proportion of 7:1, was approved by the U.S. House of Representatives. However, under pressure from the State Department, the government of Azerbaijan, and U.S. oil companies, the Senate did not take action. The Clinton administration argued that adopting the Porter Amendment would be tantamount to expressing a position on Nagorno Karabagh's status. These attempts to regulate humanitarian assistance underscore the correlation between humanitarian and political problems in the context of the conflict. On closer examination, these problems explain Nagorno Karabagh's posture on solving the issues of refugees, assistance, and other humanitarian matters and of political status together, in a single comprehensive package. Taking a piecemeal approach or placing preconditions simply has not worked.
UN Security Council Resolutions Questions relating to territories, blockades, and humanitarian aid to refugees have been touched upon in the four resolutions of the United Nations Security Council concerning Nagorno Karabagh. Resolution 822 of April 30, 1993, referred to the forces that overtook the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan as "local Armenian forces," thus refuting the hypothesis that the armed forces of Armenia had any connection with this development. The resolution called for implementation of a set of measures in the region, including the cessation of military activities and hostile acts, withdrawal of forces from Kelbajar, and resumption of negotiations. Instead, the government of Azerbaijan failed to terminate its hostile blockade of Nagorno Karabagh, and Karabagh refused to abandon control over the Kelbajar district. The subsequent bombardment of Nagorno Karabagh by Azerbaijani artillery from fortifications based at Agdam left the Karabagh army no choice but to disable these military installations. Security Council Resolution 853 of July 30, 1993, welcomed the conflicting sides' adoption of the "timetable of urgent steps" in compliance with Resolution 822. At the same time, it criticized the continuing hostilities and particularly the bombing of settlements and the taking of Agdam. The first reference was to the Azerbaijani bombing of Armenian civilian targets and the second to Karabagh's response. The resolution urged the Armenian government "to continue to exert its influence" on the Armenians of Nagorno Karabagh. After another Azerbaijani military strike in 1993, Resolution 874 of October 14, 1993, recommended to the conflicting parties an "adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council Resolutions 822 and 853," which had been prepared by the CSCE Minsk Group. The last UN measure relating to the Karabagh conflict, Security Council Resolution 884, was adopted on November 12, 1993. The resolution condemned both the violation of the then established cease-fire and the excessive use of force in response thereto. Reference was being made to violations of the cease-fire by Azerbaijan and the reaction of the Karabagh forces in occupying the Zangelan district and Horadiz. The absence of Shushi and Lachin from these resolutions attests to their special status in the Karabagh negotiations.
The real crux of the negotiations quagmire is Nagorno Karabagh's ultimate political status. While Azerbaijan objects to everything except "broad autonomy," Stepanakert's formula rules out any proposed solution by which Karabagh's relationship with Azerbaijan is to be "vertical," that is to say, subjecting it to Azerbaijani jurisdiction. Moreover, Karabagh insists on direct access to Armenia and the world as part of its status. In short, Karabagh will not accept any form of return to its past status as an enclave. It believes that any solution must reflect the existing political realities. The Nagorno Karabagh Republic has maintained an independent existence for five years. It possesses all the essential attributes and institutions of statehood. Indeed, Karabagh's de facto statehood satisfies the requirements of conventional and customary international law for de jure recognition. It is a definite territory with a permanent population that has elected a government effectively representing it at home and abroad. Whatever one's interpretation, it is undeniable that the cease-fire over the last three years has rested on the political-military balance forged in the relations between the parties to the conflict. Thus, any unilateral measure that disregards the need for a comprehensive settlement risks breaching the established equilibrium and can spark the resumption of military operations. Accordingly, in the absence of the USSR's constitutional norms, and in view of the emergence of new relations among the various political forces in the region, the constitutional system that existed before 1988 can find no basis in today's political reality. In such a circumstance, the status quo ante bellum cannot apply to the case of Nagorno Karabagh. From this perspective, as well as from that of Karabagh's security, all suggestions to restore the prewar and especially the pre-1988 situation are unrealistic and unacceptable. Rather, a whole range of other options to conclude
a peaceful settlement must be examined. While not necessarily
acceptable to either of the parties, the options available anticipate
the following as far as political status is concerned:
Unfortunately, the prevailing practice in the OSCE's diplomatic strategy has been to seek incremental agreements on non-political issues (military, economic, and refugee questions) before the resolution of Karabagh's political status. This approach is impractical. It invites major difficulties in resolving problems that are of a multiple character. These include the questions of troop withdrawals from the occupied territories of both sides, demilitarization issues, return of refugees, and the entire matter of ensuring the physical security of the people of Karabagh. Clearly, all issues emanating from the Karabagh conflict are inter-related and cannot be solved separately or in advance of an agreement on the political status of Nagorno Karabagh.
The Nagorno Karabagh dispute constitutes a legal and political case unconnected with other territorial, ethnic, nationality, or minority disputes within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, it requires a contemporary and creative approach that is predicated on the merits of the case and on present realities. This approach must address not only the consequences of the dispute but its historic reasons as well. By common agreement, the principle of resolving the confrontation around Karabagh by peaceful means and on the basis of mutual compromises is paramount. However, the contending parties harbor mutually exclusive prerequisites for an acceptable compromise agreement. Azerbaijan insists on its retention of sovereignty over all the territory assigned to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. These include the city of Shushi and the Lachin Corridor. It insists, further, that Nagorno Karabagh abandon its quest for independence. For its part, Nagorno Karabagh maintains that the withdrawal of its forces from certain captured territories can only be implemented after the fundamental issues of security and political status are finalized. Despite the divergence of their perceptions, both parties are committed to the search for solutions based on compromise. The first fragile, but important, instances of success in this effort include: maintenance of the cease-fire, stabilization of the military front since 1994, an exchange of prisoners of war and hostages in May 1996, and Azerbaijan's recognition, albeit inconsistent, that the contending parties are two--Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabagh. These steps demonstrate that progress can be achieved through compromise. However, the state of relative peace in the zone of conflict is not yet supported by international guarantees and commitments to assign OSCE peacekeepers to the military dividing line. The cease-fire is based solely on the goodwill of the conflicting parties. Such an unstable equilibrium can be upset by the slightest shift in the political situation or the balance of military forces. One other factor concerning the efficacy of the peace process is the competing role of third parties in the region. At one or another time, Turkey, Russia, and Iran each have undertaken unilateral mediation motivated in large part by their own regional interests. In each instance the bilateral problems between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabagh were further exacerbated. However, internal problems with minority peoples in their own countries have united these three regional powers in favoring Azerbaijan's insistence that the principle of territorial integrity must override that of self-determination. Pronouncements from the United States and other OSCE member nations have increasingly embraced the same position. Its wide acceptance notwithstanding, this position defies the letter and the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, which allots equal value to self-determination and territorial integrity. The promotion of one principle to the exclusion of the other complicates and prejudices the outcome of the OSCE peace process. It also encourages the sides to adopt intractable bargaining positions. The latest example is Azerbaijan's refusal to recognize Nagorno Karabagh as the second party to the dispute. This is clearly a retreat from the position adopted at the 1994 CSCE Budapest Summit. It has unilaterally reduced the area of compromise and aroused great suspicion on the part of Nagorno Karabagh. The current incapacity of the international negotiators to reconcile the positions of the contending parties carries a powerful potential to rekindle the conflict and enlarge its territorial scope. Thus far, the OSCE peace process has not provided an effective mechanism to legally or politically buttress the few instances of agreement. It has failed to demonstrate an even-handed approach to solutions. Its espousal of the primacy of borders over the will of a people has set the stage for deepening the conflict and broadening its scope. This dispute must be treated as a discrete problem with its own unique causes and characteristics. To the extent possible, competing geopolitical, economic, and partisan interests must not intrude in the search for common ground between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabagh. The fear of setting precedents in the region or elsewhere must not override the fundamental interests of the two sides. The Helsinki Accords clearly hold the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination to be equal. To deny this and the present reality of Nagorno Karabagh as the legitimate second party to the dispute will only render the OSCE's efforts impotent. The Republic of Armenia's special role in the peace process is indispensable. Secure land links with Nagorno Karabagh must be irrevocably guaranteed by the international community. The assignment of Armenia as a guarantor of Nagorno Karabagh's security and economic viability requires definition and confirmation by the OSCE and the United Nations. These same institutions must also extend guarantees to provide all people who live in or will return to the disputed areas protection against the violation of internationally recognized human rights. It is essential to address the sources of the Karabagh problem and the realities that have emerged since 1988. The international community cannot realistically avoid recognizing the fact that Nagorno Karabagh is the first instance in the second tier of decolonization of the Soviet Union. This requires the development of new political and security policies which remove potential sources of conflict. These policies must face the new realities and help formulate principles that define political and security arrangements in this area of conflict. Equally important is the deployment of peacekeepers and the establishment of logical borders within which both national groups can exercise their right to govern themselves. In the end, international aversion to implementing the principle of self-determination will only ensure continued instability and could even trigger a post-Soviet recolonization effort. Integration and cooperation between neighboring states are both feasible and possible in the sphere of commerce. Regional economic cooperation can serve as an essential instrument for lasting peace. The establishment of regional economic structures and the opening of secure transit routes for capital, goods, and people can bridge the gaps between contiguous national entities. The Lachin Corridor is one such example. This gateway to Armenia and the West must be safeguarded. Open borders among all states in the region will build confidence in the future for peoples who are in conflict today. The resolution of the Karabagh conflict necessitates that the governments of Nagorno Karabagh and Azerbaijan negotiate directly, within the OSCE framework and bilaterally. A permanent solution to the conflict can be achieved only if Nagorno Karabagh is a full partner in the negotiations process and an immediate participant in establishing the terms of settlement.
Postscript
by the Armenian Assembly of America: The decisions taken by the OSCE at its 1994 Budapest summit affirmed the Minsk Group process. It raised expectations that with the strong support of the international community the parties to the Karabagh conflict would reach agreement on a settlement. If anything, the summit strengthened the commitment of the parties to maintain the cease-fire. In contrast, the statement of the OSCE chairman-in-office issued at the end of the December 2-3, 1996, Lisbon summit proved an unfortunate step. It attempted to codify the legal status of the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh without consultation, let alone agreement. It adopted a formula advanced by negotiators for the Republic of Azerbaijan without obtaining the consent of either the Republic of Armenia or the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh. As such, it attempted to predetermine the status of Karabagh, the subject lying at the core of the dispute. The statement called for the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan, for the self-determination of Nagorno Karabagh within Azerbaijan, and for security through mutual obligations. While on the declarative level, the OSCE chairman appeared to be defending basic principles, the inherent contradiction of the principles only underlined the difficulty of disentangling the issues surrounding Karabagh. The external borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan have not been in question. Neither nation has present claims on the other. Divorced from this matter, the status of Karabagh is placed in a different light. The struggle of the Karabagh Armenians has been with the very state that, over the entire course of the twentieth century, has failed to respect any measure of security and self-government for Nagorno Karabagh. The Republic of Azerbaijan has confused circumstances further by inserting the politics of oil in the equation. Baku has introduced the prospects of international profit from new Caspian Sea oil fields as a lever to impose an unacceptable settlement of the Karabagh conflict. While this oil diplomacy has gained it favor among certain states, Azerbaijan continues to pursue a strategy that seeks to circumvent due process. The statement of the OSCE chairman-in-office, while it may have encouraged one party, has served to alert others that the integrity of the negotiations process is at serious risk. Instead of assisting the process to move forward, it has only raised more questions that require attention. It has also created new concerns among vulnerable peoples that international negotiators are prone to disregard principle and even-handedness when tempted by the prospects of economic gain.
End Notes 1. Christian-era Armenian churches, monasteries, and other historical monuments located in Karabagh date to the fourth century A.D. 2. In addition to the autonomous areas in Russia, there were seven "autonomies" in the former republics of the USSR, of which five were located in the relatively small region of Transcaucasia. They were established during the 1921-1925 period and served as a means for the realization of Joseph Stalin's "nationalities policy" which sought to "divide and conquer" by pitting the nationalities against each other. 3. "The means for accelerating social-economic development in the Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijani SSR for 1988-95," adopted on March 24, 1988, by the Supreme Soviet's Presidium, and the joint resolution on July 26 of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet Presidium about "Practical measures for the realization of the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Nagorno Karabagh problem." 4. The legislature elected Robert Kocharian president pro tempore and decided to hold national elections two years later. Elections were held on November 24, 1996, and Kocharian was reelected president by popular vote. 5. The United States, Russia, Germany, France, Czech Republic, Sweden, Italy, Belarus, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. 6. CSCE became OSCE at this time. 7. Very sensitive to the question of real guarantees, Nagorno Karabagh vividly recalls the British guarantees of 1918-1920 which did not prevent the application of force by the first Azerbaijani Republic, and the "guarantees" of the Soviet Union which permitted the de-Armenianization of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (another Armenian region subordinated to Baku) and the national, cultural, socioeconomic, and thus demographic deprivations of the Karabagh Armenians. 8. Also important in this regard is the collective memory of the 1915-1923 Turkish genocide of the Armenian people, which, while denied by Ankara, is comprehensively documented in the United States National Archives, the British Public Record Office, the French and German official archives, and repositories around the world. 9. As mentioned above, Karabagh frames the conflict as between it and Azerbaijan, while the latter, fearful of inadvertently granting any sort of recognition to Karabagh, prefers the concept of an interstate war and thus engages Armenia alone. 10. Conversely, Nagorno Karabagh refugees have received none. To this day, only the International Committee of the Red Cross, "Doctors Without Borders," and a few other charitable organizations offer assistance, however limited, to the refugees and needy living in Karabagh. 11. Ambassador Jack Maresca, former U.S. representative in the Minsk Group, has opined that "What the world now needs is an accepted arrangement which can provide ethnic groups that seek their own sovereignty with something between autonomy and independence. Historically, there has never been a real alternative path for groups seeking sovereignty other than the use of violence, and no attractive alternatives to full independence."
The Armenian Center for National and International
Studies
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