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Unresolved wars have poisoned the newly independent republics of the
former Soviet south-and could flare a new if the so-called frozen
conflicts of the Black Sea region are ever thawed out, somebody will
need to be standing by with a very large bucket indeed. To outsiders,
that may seem like an odd warning: unless you have a special interest
in the obscure enclaves of small, impoverished states, where local
feuds have flared up and died down, a frozen conflict may sound like
a conflict you can forget. But such a conclusion would be wrong: the
region's unresolved wars-in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno-Karabakh-are a big reason why the newly independent states
of the former Soviet south have failed miserably to fulfil their potential.
Instead of enjoying their freedom, they have emerged into the world
as stunted, embittered and ill-governed creatures. And if real fighting
flares again-a process which has begun in South Ossetia (see article)-things
could become far worse. At the heart of each conflict is a claimed
mini-state whose rulers prevailed, by dint of Russian arms, in a
local war. While there are huge differences, these statelets have
things in common. Ten years or more of isolation under unrecognised
governments have left them as harsh, militarised societies, with
few functioning institutions, and economies open to crime. South
Ossetia is the pettiest, but currently the hottest of the conflict
zones. It is a landlocked province of Georgia which would have no
viability as a legitimate country. It survives as a conduit for
smuggling between Georgia and Russia, mainly in cheap spirits, arms
and grain, under the diplomatic protection of the Russian government
and the military protection of Russian troops. Of the four statelets,
Karabakh comes closest to being a normal society-at least for the
ethnic Armenians who remain there. Nearly a million people from
both sides of the war were put to flight by the fighting which concluded
in 1994 with a big victory by soldiers from Karabakh and Armenia
itself. Especially since 2001, when a local bully and racketeer,
Samvel Babayan, was put in jail, Karabakh-which calls itself independent
but is in practice virtually joined to Armenia-has had something
recognisable as local politics and a mixed economy.
Investment from the Armenian diaspora has boosted the economy.
One new arrival from America, Vartkes Anivian, started a dairy-products
company after the war, and now employs 250 people. Municipal elections
have just been held in the enclave-to the fury of Azerbaijan, to
which Karabakh legally belongs-and there was genuine competition
between the candidates. The atmosphere in Stepanakert, Karabakh's
capital, is orderly in a post-Soviet way, not chaotic. So Karabakh
might have a decent future if the enclave's future could somehow
be settled. Four years ago, a compromise seemed within reach: most
of Karabakh would have been joined to Armenia, while the Azeris
recovered the surrounding areas and gained a corridor between their
republic's two parts. More recently, the mood on both sides has
hardened, and a big body of Azerbaijani opinion longs to recover
the land by force.
Small wars, or medium? The fighting over Karabakh was and could
again become a fair-sized war; South Ossetia by comparison is a
small, though strategically significant, squabble. Abkhazia, in
Georgia, and Transdniestria, in Moldova, fall somewhere in between.
Both Abkhazia and Transdniestria can make claims to special political
status, if not to independence, on historical grounds. Both regimes
control territories and economies capable of standing alone. But
both are willing hostages of Russia, which helped them fight their
wars of secession when the Soviet Union collapsed, and has given
them military and diplomatic support ever since. It has issued passports
so freely that probably a majority of the population in each enclave
could claim Russian nationality. But Russia's "protection"
has also become the main obstacle to a constitutional settlement.
Russia prefers to keep the enclaves as its own pawns. At its most
mischievous, the Kremlin's strategy may view Transdniestria as a
second version of Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave near Poland-in
other words, a trouble-making outpost on the borders of NATO. And
some of the worst features of Russia's own governance have been
transferred to its protégés in Georgia and Moldova:
organised crime, corruption, and authoritarian leadership. For the
people of these non-countries, life goes on, after a fashion. "It
is a normal town, but blown up a bit," says a United Nations
official trying to put the best face on Sukhumi, "capital"
of Abkhazia. And there is indeed the ghost of something lovely in
the landscape, where the beaches curve north to the Russian border.
"It is a normal town, but blown up a bit" But to call
Sukhumi "normal", even by the elastic standards of the
Caucasus, is stretching things. For one thing, half of its population
is missing. Ethnic Georgians fled the city or were driven out in
the civil war of 1992-93. And to say that Sukhumi is blown up "a
bit" risks flattering a town where only about one-third of
the buildings are in good shape, one-third are badly run down, and
one-third are derelict. The roads are crumbling, the pavements are
grassing over, and the airport is dead save for a few UN helicopters.
Tourists from Russia are the mainstay, along with agriculture, of
the visible economy. The invisible economy belongs to burly men
who drive smart cars with handguns on their hips. They, or their
like, run a blacker-than-black trade centred on the port. Smuggling
probably involves drugs, arms, fuel and stolen cars. "Whatever
you have", says the UN official, "it disappears into a
black hole when it hits the docks." Tiraspol, the capital of
Transdniestria, presents a more orderly façade. Streets are
eerily quiet and clean, and almost bare of cars, even on a weekday
afternoon. Nobody in civilian clothes carries a gun openly. A statue
of Lenin looks down from a pink marble column in front of the presidential
palace. The Bolshevik leader looks uncannily like Transdniestria's
own bearded "president", Igor Smirnov, a former metalworker
from Kamchatka in the Russian Pacific who moved to Tiraspol in 1987
as a factory manager and manoeuvred his way into power. Mr Smirnov's
son heads the "state customs committee", the second-biggest
job in a land which lives largely on trade, licit and illicit, between
Ukraine and the rest of Moldova. In the past month both Moldova
and Ukraine have announced much tighter customs controls on goods
moving out of Transdniestria. Moldova was retaliating against a
decision by the authorities in Transdniestra to shut schools there
still teaching Romanian in the Latin alphabet. But despite such
occasional flurries of firm government, experience suggests that
Transdniestria's borders will remain porous enough for it to go
on supplying Moldovan markets with untaxed consumer goods, and to
go on shipping its more sinister cargoes, including arms, out through
Ukraine or by air. According to a recent report from the International
Crisis Group, a Brussels think-tank, Transdniestria has five or
six arms factories making small arms, mortars and missile-launchers,
for sale to the world's trouble-spots. A recent study from the German
Marshall Fund of the United States has called the conflict zones
"unresolved fragments of Soviet Empire [which] now serve as
shipping points for weapons, narcotics, and victims of human trafficking,
as breeding grounds for transnational organised crime, and last
but not least, for terrorism". That may be a bit too hard on
Karabakh, but a fairly accurate account of Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Transdniestria. It may be time for the world to slop them out.
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