Thank you. I welcome this opportunity to discuss aloud and together the history, development, present situation and future prospects for the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue. I believe the idea is both good and timely. I believe that such joint, public explorations are useful and should facilitate a healthy civic debate on premises and prospects, always with the purpose clearly in mind: that what we seek is a peaceful, lasting resolution to this conflict.

I've looked at the agenda of these two days; the topics and speakers are very diversified and reflect varying political perspectives and political forces. Such a diversified spectrum will provide us with a better picture of the range of opinions in our republic on this issue.

Of course, this is my wish. I hope that those who speak will freely express their opinions, honestly, and that no one will use this opportunity to settle political scores. There are dangers in using the Nagorno Karabakh issue to obtain individual political dividends.

I will try to be as open as possible, to present not just Armenia's position, but also our take on those international situations and events which may effect the Nagorno Karabakh process, our perception of the adversary's views, and also the evolution and dynamics of the resolution process.

Let me start with the last.

Really, we must understand the dynamics and evolution of the process if we are to understand our situation today and the choices before us.

Let me break down the NK process into stages during which both the format and nature of the negotiations evolved, as did the content of the discussions.

This most recent phase became a conflict, when, in 1988, Azerbaijan used force to respond to peaceful demonstrations and demands, thus resulting in military activities. During those early years, there were various incongruent, uncoordinated, random, impulsive efforts at mediation from within the former soviet space. These efforts did not turn into a coherent process, however, and no documents were produced.

In 1992, the resolution process became internationalized. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which both Armenia and Azerbaijan were members, took a decision to resolve the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's status through a conference in Minsk. As a result, the CSCE Minsk process was born, with the participation of Nagorno Karabakh. The Russian Federation continued to remain engaged, often competing with the Minsk Group. At the same time, the conflict itself extended beyond the borders of Nagorno Karabakh, when as a result of Azerbaijan's aggression, Armenian forces were compelled to bring certain territories under Armenian control, for the purpose of assuring Nagorno Karabakh's security. By May 1994, there was a mutually agreed upon ceasefire, and therefore, a halt to military activities.

As military activities ceased, the OSCE, at a Summit in Budapest, harmonized the various negotiation tracks. They created the Minsk Group co-chairs structure, formalized the negotiation process, and put an end to competition among the various mediators. Thus the end of militarization coincided with the creation of a mechanism for serious negotiations.

This cycle of negotiations that has now gone on for over a decade, can be divided into 4 stages.

- The first stage began with the OSCE Budapest Summit and ended with the OSCE Lisbon Summit.
- The second stage covered the post-Lisbon period through the change of presidential administration in Armenia.
- The third stage stretched to the death of Father Aliyev.
- And the fourth stage is the one we're in now, that started with the change of administration in Azerbaijan.

In the first stage of the formal process, negotiations revolved around a document which dealt with eliminating the consequences of the conflict, but didn't address the issue of political status of Nagorno Karabakh. During this period, for the first time, direct negotiations began to take place between Armenia and Azerbaijan. That is where the process of clarifying Nagorno Karabakh's political status began. The decision to commence direct talks was made at a regular Minsk Group meeting in Bonn, in November 1995. These talks were also expected to produce an agreed-upon text on the Nagorno Karabakh issue, to be presented for inclusion in the Lisbon Summit's Political Document. Two weeks prior to the Summit, the Azerbaijani side retreated from this agreement. Further, they went to the Summit, with the threat of a veto and held all Summit documents hostage until the Chairman-in-Office was forced to agree to present the Azerbaijani position in its own statement. This statement outlined principles under which Nagorno Karabakh was to receive the status of high autonomy. This document had no legal value, since it was only a chairman's statement. Nevertheless, Armenia rejected it.

The significant change in the second stage was that after Lisbon, and as a result of Lisbon, the Minsk Group process was suspended. The Lisbon Summit was in December 1996. The first MG meeting to follow Lisbon was held in March 1997 in Moscow. It was a very short meeting. Azerbaijan insisted that all further negotiations must be held on the basis of the Lisbon principles. Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh walked out. What must be noted here is that when the Minsk Group process was thus suspended, Nagorno Karabakh's official participation, too, ceased. I want to stress this: official participation in the plenary Minsk Group sessions ceased at that time. Otherwise, Nagorno Karabakh has continued to be an active participant.

Following the disruption of the Minsk Group process, two distinct proposals were presented to the sides: In May 97, a package solution was offered, dealing with all issues, including status, but based on Lisbon principles. Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh naturally rejected that proposal. In September 97, the co-chairs, thinking that it would be impossible to reach an agreement on status based on the Lisbon principles, went off in another direction, and proposed a step-by-step solution that assumed the return of territory without addressing the question of status. Armenia's President's serious consideration of this approach led to dramatic divisions within his administration, and contributed to his eventual resignation.

In the third phase, partly as a result of this serious turn of events, partly as a result of Armenia's new approach, and partly as a result of the renewed emphasis that there has to be a comprehensive solution that cannot be solely based on Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, the co-chairs made a successful effort in reconciling the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. The result was the Common State document which was rejected by Azerbaijan.

Direct meetings between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan followed Azerbaijan's rejection of the Common State. All together, during the third stage the two presidents met nearly two dozen times. They came to share an awareness of the need for a comprehensive solution. Father Aliyev, accepting the inevitable, tried to negotiate in a way as to reap such dividends that would make the whole package acceptable to his people.

The result, in April 2001, was the Key West document, the second important document created during this third stage. The Key West document clearly affirmed the fact of the self-determination of the people of Nagorno Karabakh. Thus, in the six years from Lisbon to Key West, there had, in our opinion, been fundamental, radical changes in thinking on this issue - changes in sync with contemporary international developments and self-determination processes in different parts of the world.

In the fourth stage, the stage we have been in since Azerbaijan's new authorities came to power, there is a clear intent to attempt to reverse the wheel of history. The presidents do meet, although not with the former frequency. There is a parallel track of foreign ministers meetings. During those talks, the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's status is always on the agenda. Azerbaijan is part of those discussions.

Despite Azerbaijan's engagement, and the efforts of the sides to search for an acceptable resolution of the issue, Azerbaijan continues to attempt to simultaneously introduce the Nagorno Karabakh issue in those international forums which continue to abide by a traditional, conservative approach to the issues of territorial integrity and self-determination. The approach of those organizations is that

- when the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination clash with each other then the first receives preference
- all conflicts should be treated within a single resolution framework, regardless of the degree of legitimacy of grievances and gravity of the issue
- if a deviation is allowed and self-determination is recognized, it will become a precedent and a domino effect will result.

Their answer to claims of self-determination is simply greater human rights and certain economic benefits. This approach ignores a great many factors including the role of history in shaping of one's identity and destiny.

Today, everyone recognizes that these principles cannot be universally applied, that there are places in the world where more acceptable solutions can and are being found, and states - new and old - continue to live in new relationships to each other. In our time, we have witnessed East Timor's independence through referendum, we witnessed the signing of an agreement in Sudan putting an end to a decades-old conflict on the basis of the notion of referendum to be held in one portion of the country in six years. We are all following serious deliberations about the possibility of a referendum to determine Kosovo's status. Among the political, legal, academic experts working in and around those places, there is a growing awareness of the possibility and reality of recognizing the right of self-determination in certain circumstances.

In all cases, one must judge existing self-determination struggles each on its own merits, each in terms of its own historical, legal circumstances, as well as the realities on the ground.

As such, we can divide today's self-determination conflicts into four types determined by the combination of degree of control the state exercises over its entire territory (including the territory occupied by those striving for self-determination) and the degree of self-determination achieved by them.

Quebec, for example, falls in Category I. In this case, the territorial integrity of Canada is preserved, while the province of Quebec has voted to remain part of Canada; that is, they have exercised their right to self-determination.

The overwhelming majority of today's secessionists fall in Category II, where the movements struggle without any degree of self-determination and the state continues to fully control the territory under question. The Kurdish people's struggle in Turkey falls into this second category.

Those in Category III are the borderline cases where the state is not able to control those desiring self-determination, while they themselves are not strong enough to maintain control over their territory with any certainty of permanence, and the outcome can go either way.

Today, Nagorno Karabakh falls in a completely different, fourth, category. Azerbaijan has no control whatsoever over those territories, as Nagorno Karabakh has enjoyed, for the last 15 years, all the attributes of complete sovereignty. In this case, to attempt to win over the people of Nagorno Karabakh by enticing them with human rights and economic advantages in order to attempt to return them to Azerbaijani jurisdiction, is a simply senseless exercise. Furthermore, Nagorno Karabakh has not only been in a category of its own in terms of the length and depth of its self-determination, its situation is further reinforced and made complete by the following legal facts.

1. The self-determination component: It seceded legally, according to the laws of the day.
2. The territorial component: Its people have self-determined on those territories that have never been within the jurisdiction of independent Azerbaijan.
3. The human rights component: Azerbaijan, in perpetrating violence against people that it considered its own citizens, has lost the moral right to custody over those people.
4. Finally, the de facto political reality of 15 years of proven ability to hold elections, govern its people, protect its borders and conduct international relations.

Azerbaijan's new authorities are having a hard time coming to terms with these indisputable realities. Clear-cut, categoric changes are obvious in their approach to negotiations and the search for a resolution. Worse, and more worrisome, there are new myths and premises - public and official - on which their positions are being constructed.

First, they have convinced themselves that the essence of the issue is the issue of their territories. When this conflict began, there were no territories outside Nagorno Karabakh under Armenian control. Those territories came under Armenian control because not only was there not an agreement on Nagorno Karabakh's status, but also because Azerbaijan saw the solution in cleansing Nagorno Karabakh of all Armenians. Therefore, the solution today necessarily revolves around the determination of Nagorno Karabakh's status, and continued control over those territories guaranteeing the security of the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh.

Second, they want to believe that if they do not receive their maximum demands through negotiations, they can always resort to military solutions. It is obvious that it has not been possible nor will it be possible to conclusively resolve this issue militarily. In order for a successful military solution, arms and munitions are not sufficient against the people of Nagorno Karabakh who are defending their own homes and hearth. Azerbaijan must succeed in ethnically cleansing Nagorno Karabakh of all Armenians. Under today's circumstances, that is simply not possible. This has been proven impossible in Serbia, for example, where the former authorities nearly succeeded in their efforts at ethnic cleansing using military might. But today, they are standing trial for their crimes, and the right of the people of Kosovo to self-determination is on the table.

Third, Azerbaijan thinks that time is on their side. Of course, the obvious reason for this is their confidence in future oil revenues to enhance their military capacity. This is the greatest deception, because time is not guaranteed to work in favor of any one side. Further, international tendencies today are moving towards reinforcing the right to self-determination. The longer that Nagorno Karabakh maintains its de-facto independence, it will be that much harder to reverse the wheel of history.

Fourth, they think that an isolated Armenia will be economically unable to sustain its positions, and will sooner or later agree to serious concessions. This is in itself a faulty assumption, because it is the people of Nagorno Karabakh who must first agree to concessions. Additionally, a people who lived through the deprivations and hardships of the last decade and a half have demonstrated that they can do so again if it is life and liberty that is at stake. On the contrary, both in Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, the societies have gone past survival, and are recording economic growth.

Finally, Azerbaijan has convinced itself that by presenting Armenia as aggressor, it will become possible through resolutions in international organizations to force Armenians to capitulate. However, Armenians have succeeded in consistently demonstrating that Azerbaijan is a victim of its own aggression and that today's situation is a consequence of that aggression. If those territories must be returned to assure Nagorno Karabakh's security and future, that is possible. If those territories must be kept in order to assure Nagorno Karabakh's security and future, that, too, is possible. The purpose is security and self-determination and not territories.

To conclude, the point is the solution will not be found through military action, it will not be found through the creation of documents and resolutions in international forums, nor can there be a solution imposed on the sides from the outside. The only way to a solution is to demonstrate political will, to sit and discuss openly and honestly, by embracing realistic positions.

Armenia remains faithful to its initial premises that there cannot be a vertical link between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, that it must have a geographic link with Armenia, and that the security of the people of Nagorno Karabakh must be assured.

Today, for us, the basis of the resolution, is the affirmation of the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination and the international recognition of that right.
Azerbaijan's simply accepting this fact, and its formalization in an agreement, will make possible the start of a resolution of the matter, and the elimination of the consequences of the conflict.